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Conscription and Critique
B A Ş A K  E R T Ü R
abstract  This ar ti cle fo cuses on the dis cus sion of gen eral con scrip tion in Walter Ben ja min’s 1921 
es say “Toward the Critique of Violence.” In the es say, Ben ja min pres ents con scrip tion or com pul sory mil i­
tary ser vice along side his dis cus sions of po lice vi o lence and cap i tal pun ish ment, and as one man i fes ta tion 
of le gal vi o lence in which law­pre serv ing and law­pos it ing forms of vi o lence co in cide and mix. This ar ti cle 
pro poses that Ben ja min’s dis cus sion of con scrip tion should be read as a for mal model for un der stand ing 
how le gal subjectification in the mod ern state works more gen er al ly, and how it cir cum scribes cri tique. 
This read ing is of fered through a se ries of snap shots of var i ous veins and el e ments in Ben ja min’s es say, 
while also connecting this in ter pre ta tion to the work of a num ber of con tem po rary schol ars of co lo nial­
ism, namely Talal Asad, Da vid Scott, and Samera Esmeir, who all in voke con scrip tion as a par tic u larly 
pow er ful met a phor for mod ern law’s ten dency to col o nize cri tique.
keywords   cri tique of vi o lence, Walter Ben ja min, com pul sory mil i tary ser vice, mod ern law, le gal 
 subjectification
The Exhibit
Walter Ben ja min’s “Toward the Critique of Violence”1 pres ents a rather dense com­
pi la tion of cu ri ous ex am ples that are wide in their reach and range, and move the 
text along at a rapid pa ce. After the open ing par a graphs, we find our selves skip­
ping from pun ish ment in ed u ca tion to the fig ure of the great crim i nal, to the right 
to strike, to mil i tary vi o lence, to gen eral con scrip tion, to the death pen alty, to the 
ghostly na ture of the po lice, to parliamentarianism and be yond—all within the 
mat ter of a few pages. While these can be read as linking the text to so cial ist and 
an ar chist de bates on mil i ta rism and war, in which some of these top ics appeared 
in var i ous per mu ta tions in the pre ced ing de cades, Ben ja min’s treat ment is rather 
unique. He pres ents each as if ex pos ing a rare min eral for ma tion to light: held at 
a pe cu liar an gle, it shines brief y, re veal ing “some thing more and some thing dif­
fer ent than may per haps ap pear” (§1), be fore it is hast ily put away for the sake of 
the next ex hib it. For many who have attempted to grap ple with this chal leng ing 
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and fas ci nat ing es say, these dis cus sions have served as keys not only to its unique 
vo cab u lary but also to the dis tinc tive move ment and style of cri tique that it per­
forms. The fo cus of this ar ti cle is Ben ja min’s dis cus sion of gen eral con scrip tion, 
briefy held out to us in the course of the “Critique.”
Compared to the al lure held by some of the other man i fes ta tions of vi o lence 
that Ben ja min discusses in the es say, such as the strike or the death pen al ty, the 
dis cus sion of com pul sory mil i tary ser vice re mains a rel a tively underexplored el e­
ment of this much commented on text.2 Scholars who have paid it at ten tion have 
high lighted it as a sign of the au thor’s pre oc cu pa tion in this text with World War 
I in its im me di ate aft er math,3 and have noted its au to bio graph i cal sig nifi  cance 
given Ben ja min’s own trou bles with the war time draft.4 Ben ja min is, how ev er, 
rather em phatic about the sig nifi  cance of con scrip tion in gen er al, and also in 
par tic u lar about the task he sets him self in the es say. “A gen u inely ef ec tive cri­
tique” of com pul sory mil i tary ser vice, we are told, “co in cides with the cri tique of 
all le gal vi o lence—that is, with the cri tique of le gal or ex ec u tive pow er—and is 
not to be ac com plished with a less am bi tious pro gram” (§9). Perhaps to day the 
prob lem of con scrip tion is deemed less ur gent or sig nifi  cant than it was in Ben ja­
min’s time: mil i tary ser vice is no lon ger com pul sory in most ju ris dic tions, while 
con sci en tious ob jec tion is a le gal right in ap prox i ma tely one quar ter of the coun­
tries where con scrip tion is enforced.5 More im por tant, con tem po rary forms of 
war and mil i ta rism have proven them selves to be no lon ger de pen dent on con­
scrip tion, con trary to Ben ja min’s claim in the es say that mil i ta rism “could only 
arise through gen eral con scrip tion” (§9). But, as I at tempt to lay out in this ar ti­
cle, the dis cus sion of con scrip tion is sig nifi  cant and in deed still rel e vant in that 
it pro vi des a for mal model for un der stand ing how le gal subjectification in the 
mod ern state works more gen er al ly, and how it cir cum scribes cri tique. The fol­
low ing sec tions of er this read ing through a se ries of snap shots of var i ous veins 
and el e ments in the “Critique,” while also connecting this read ing to the work of 
a num ber of con tem po rary schol ars of co lo nial ism who in voke con scrip tion as a 
par tic u larly pow er ful met a phor for de scrib ing mod ern law’s ten dency to col o nize 
cri tique.
Natural and Legal Ends
In the “Critique,” the anal y sis of con scrip tion builds on an im por tant dis tinc tion 
that Ben ja min makes be tween “nat u ral ends” and “le gal ends.” Eventually, he sug­
gests that gen eral con scrip tion is one way in which the state turns its nat u ral ends 
into le gal ends. But what does that mean ex act ly, and whence this dis tinc tion?
In the es say, the dis tinc tion stems from Ben ja min’s re vi sion of how vi o lence 
is jus ti fied in the o ries of nat u ral law and pos i tive law. In nat u ral law the o ry, just 
ends are un der stood to jus tify the (vi o lent) means, while in pos i tive law the o ry, 
Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/critical-times/article-pdf/2/2/270/698851/270ertur.pdf
by guest
on 11 December 2019
C R IT IC A L T I M E S 2:2  |  AU G U ST 2019  |  272
just means are un der stood to jus tify the (vi o lent) ends. Despite their seem ing 
op po si tion, Ben ja min points out that these two ap proaches con verge in so far as 
both con ceive of the ques tion of jus ti fi ca tion of vi o lence in terms of a means­ends 
re la tion ship and pro poses in stead that “the cir cle is aban doned, and the cri te ria 
for just ends and jus ti fied means are established in de pen dently from one an oth er” 
(§3). Ben ja min then pro vi sion ally sides with the ap proach of pos i tive law the o ry, 
which, in maintaining that means jus tify ends, eval u ates the le gal ity of the means 
in de pen dently of the ends it sup pos edly serves, and thereby al lows for a “dif er en ti­
a tion in the sphere of means itself, with out regard for the ends they serve” (§1). Ben­
ja min’s tem po rary pref er ence for pos i tive law the ory must be un der stood in re la tion 
to his wider pro ject in this text, which is to pro vide “an out line for a pol i tics of pure 
me di a cy,”6 or to at tempt to con ceive of jus tice in the sphere of hu man ac tion and 
free dom with out fall ing back on cri te ria that are driven by log ics of in stru men tal­
i ty. Compared to nat u ral law the o ry, which judges means in re la tion to whether 
they serve just ends and is there fore driven en tirely by in stru men tal ism, pos i tive 
law the ory can be seen, at least pro vi sion al ly, as shun ning all cri te ria of in stru men­
tal i ty, as it fo cuses pri mar ily on the ques tion of whether the means them selves are 
jus ti fied, that is, le gal. Ben ja min then moves away from this pro vi sional al li ance 
with pos i tive law the ory by pointing out the ways in which this ap proach closes 
in on itself, “is com pletely grounded in itself ” (§4) and is there fore merely self­
ref er en tial. We may read Ben ja min here as sig nal ing pos i tive law’s fail ure to take 
ac count of the his to ric ity of pos ited law, its in abil ity to ques tion how law be came 
law in the first place, and its con se quent in ad e quacy for a cri tique of the wider 
frame work of in stru men tal ity in which pos ited law serves as a means to the ends 
of the mod ern state.
The vo cab u lary of le gal ends and nat u ral ends that Ben ja min pro poses at the 
out set of the es say must be un der stood as a prod uct of this pro vi sional yet crit i cal 
al li ance. Positive law fo cuses on means pri mar ily to de ter mine whether an end is 
“sanc tioned” (as op posed to “just” in a nat u ral law frame work) or “un sanc tioned” 
(as op posed to “un just”). Thus, “pos i tive law de mands from ev ery form of vi o lence 
ev i dence of its his tor i cal or i gin, which un der cer tain con di tions con serves its le gal­
i ty, its sanc tion” (§5). But in pos i tive law, the ques tion of his to ric ity is bound in a 
self­ref er en tial frame work. Ben ja min’s own terms, “le gal ends” and “nat u ral ends,” 
can be un der stood to cor re spond to pos i tive law’s dis tinc tion be tween sanc tioned 
and un sanc tioned ends while inscribing the ques tion of law’s own his to ric ity into 
that dis tinc tion. In Ben ja min’s ac count, sanc tioned or “le gal” ends are those that 
are his tor i cally rec og nized; un sanc tioned or “nat u ral” ends, by con trast, are those 
that are not his tor i cally rec og nized. Therefore, the ques tion of law’s own his to ric­
i ty, usu ally brack eted out of con sid er ation in pos i tive law the o ry, is brought into 
Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/critical-times/article-pdf/2/2/270/698851/270ertur.pdf
by guest
on 11 December 2019
E RT Ü R | C O N S C R I P T IO N A N D C R IT IQ U E  | 273
play with this new vo cab u lary, in line with Ben ja min’s claim that “only a his tor i cal­
phil o soph i cal re fec tion on law” will pro vide the stance from which a cri tique of 
vi o lence may be ar tic u lated (§4).
The Prerogative
Now that we have a clearer sense of the dis tinc tion, we may bet ter grasp the 
in stances and ef ects of its ob fus ca tion. In the pas sages pre ced ing the anal y sis 
of gen eral con scrip tion, Ben ja min pro poses that mod ern law does not al low any 
agent apart from the state to pur sue its nat u ral ends le gal ly: “It can be for mu lated 
as a uni ver sal maxim of con tem po rary Eu ro pean leg is la tion that all nat u ral ends of 
in di vid ual per sons must col lide with le gal ends if they are pur sued with a greater 
or lesser de gree of vi o lence” (§6). Ben ja min identifies an ex cep tion to this max im, 
feet ingly and in pa ren the ses, in the right to self­de fense, which al lows an in di vid­
u al’s os ten si bly “nat u ral” end of self­pres er va tion to be inscribed in pos ited law. 
Another ex cep tion that even tu ally be comes quite cen tral to the text, as well as to 
the cri tique it per forms, is that of the right to strike, whereby or ga nized la bor is 
le gally allowed to pur sue its nat u ral ends with a cer tain de gree of vi o lence. These 
two rights, the in di vid ual le gal sub ject’s right to self­de fense and the right to strike 
granted to or ga nized la bor as a le gal sub ject, are presented in the “Critique” as 
le gally sanc tioned ex cep tions to the state’s mo nop oly over le gal vi o lence.
Importantly, we may no tice that a reformulation has taken place in the course 
of Ben ja min’s dis cus sion of these ex cep tions: the state’s mo nop oly over le gal vi o­
lence has been re cast as the state’s pre rog a tive to ren der its nat u ral ends le gal. A seem­
ingly mi nor ges ture that oc curs be tween the lines, this reformulation is in fact 
highly sig nifi  cant be cause it deftly side lines the tra di tional op po si tion be tween, to 
use one pos si ble set of terms, raison d’état and the Rule of Law, sig nal ing in stead 
how raison d’état is al ways al ready inscribed into the Rule of Law. It may be that 
a sim i lar reformulation is at work in Ben ja min’s pro posal of the ter mi nol ogy of 
law­pos it ing and law­pre serv ing vi o lence, which could be read as an at tempt to 
su per vene a more com mon vo cab u lary of “ag res sive” or “of en sive” ver sus “de fen­
sive” vi o lence. While seem ingly paralleling that duo, Ben ja min’s cho sen vo cab u­
lary points to the ul ti mate in sta bil ity of a strict dis tinc tion, let alone an op po si tion 
be tween ag res sive and de fen sive forms of vi o lence. It also al lows him to for mu­
late as tute ac counts of the ways in which vi o lence and law are entangled in var i ous 
dif er ent in sti tu tional for ma tions.
If the state’s mo nop oly over le gal vi o lence is its pre rog a tive to ren der its nat u­
ral ends le gal, then con scrip tion can be un der stood to of er a key par a digm for the 
work ings of that pre rog a tive: “For char ac ter is tic of mil i ta rism, which could only 
arise through gen eral con scrip tion, is a dou ble ness in the func tion of vi o lence. 
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Militarism is the com pul sion to the uni ver sal use of vi o lence as a means to the 
ends of the state” (§9). In other words, mil i ta rism or ga nizes so cial and po lit i cal life 
so as to max i mize the state’s war­mak ing ca pac i ty, which in turn al lows the state 
to pur sue its nat u ral ends (or “na tional in ter ests”) ag res sively and unrestrictedly. 
General con scrip tion pro vi des the le gal in fra struc ture for the mil i ta ris tic or ga ni za­
tion and ad min is tra tion of life, giv ing the state the le gal ca pac ity to force sub jects 
to serve at its dis pos al. Hence the dou bling of the func tion of vi o lence in mil i ta­
rism, whereby nat u ral ends are folded into le gal ends through gen eral con scrip­
tion, and law­pre serv ing vi o lence (the le gal com pul sion to serve) is made to bol ster 
law­pos it ing vi o lence (war).
Self-Defense
As one of the ex cep tions to the state’s pre rog a tive to ren der its nat u ral ends le gal, 
self­de fense has an in ter est ing tra jec tory in the “Critique.” It mer its a brief con­
sid er ation here be cause of the res o nance be tween “self­de fense” (Notwehr) and 
“con scrip tion” (Wehrpflicht—lit er ally “de fense du ty”), and, in deed, the con tin­
uum in mod ern law be tween the right to pre serve one self and the duty to pre­
serve the na tion.7 As we have seen, Ben ja min cur so rily pres ents self­de fense as 
be ing “in con fict” with the gen eral maxim that dis al lows the le gal pur suit of nat­
u ral ends to le gal sub jects other than the state: “The con tra dic tion be tween this 
[the max im] and the right to self­de fense will find a clar i fi ca tion in the course 
of the fol low ing re fec tions” (§6). However, when Ben ja min does return to the 
ques tion of self­de fense to ward the end of the es say, he frames it in an en tirely 
dif er ent reg is ter. Instead of fulfilling his ear lier prom ise to clar ify the con tra dic­
tory in scrip tion of self­de fense into pos ited law, Ben ja min evokes it to ex plain 
the law­dis man tling (rather than law­pos it ing or law­pre serv ing) char ac ter of 
di vine vi o lence. Juxtaposing the com mand ment “Thou shalt not kill” with Ju da­
ism’s re fusal to con demn a kill ing done in self­de fense, Ben ja min sug ests that 
rather than pos it ing a rule or a stan dard of judg ment, the com mand ment “ex ists 
as a guide line of ac tion for the agent or com mu nity that has to con front it in sol­
i tude and, in ter ri ble cases, take on the re spon si bil ity of disregarding it” (§18). 
The move is very in ter est ing be cause self­de fense be comes no lon ger strictly a 
“nat u ral right” that is also con doned by pos ited law as a ne ces sity and by ex ten­
sion a du ty, but rather an eth i cal op tion, and one that need not be taken by “the 
agent or com mu ni ty” in ques tion.8 In other words, the ques tion of self­de fense 
is sud denly sal vaged both from the ap pa ra tus of nat u ral law phi los o phy that sees 
it as a nat u ral right and from the rid dle of le gal ized nat u ral ends. It is in stead 
re stored to the realm of eth ics, or in the lan guage of the “Critique,” to “the mor al­ 
his tor i cal sphere” (§9). This strip ping of self­de fense of its nat u ral and le gal 
trap pings has a bear ing on how we may un der stand what cri tique is, does, and 
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prom ises in Ben ja min’s text. Conversely, it sheds light on the prob lem of con­
scrip tion and the chal lenge it poses to cri tique by foreclosing the space of eth i cal 
con sid er ation.
The Conscript
General con scrip tion is a way in which the state’s nat u ral ends are ren dered as le gal 
ends or inscribed into pos ited law, be cause it al lows the state to le gally lay claim 
over the lives of sub jects solely for pur poses of its own pres er va tion, per pet u a tion, 
and ex pan sion. Further, most at tempts by the conscripted sub ject to fee the state’s 
le gal ized claim of pos ses sion over one self will be crim i nal ized. Thus, gen eral con­
scrip tion be comes a for mal open ing within law, allowing the state’s nat u ral ends to 
in stall them selves in and as law. Importantly, the con script, the sub ject who is com­
pul so rily en listed in the ar my, is the me dium of this in scrip tion of the state’s nat u ral 
ends (i.e., through be ing made to serve these ends) into le gal ends (i.e., into pos ited 
law so that not only is the claim le gal ized, but also at tempts to slip away from the grasp 
of the claim are crim i nal ized). The con script thus be comes the ob ject, in stru ment, and 
agent of the state’s nat u ral ends, and this be com ing ob ject/in stru ment/agent takes 
place in and through pos ited law.
Although Ben ja min does not ex plic itly tell us much more about the fig ure of 
the con script itself, the sub se quent pas sages of the same par a graph, which dis cuss 
the chal lenge that con scrip tion poses to cri tique, re veal that the prob lem is very 
much a prob lem of the sub ject, with Ben ja min’s cur sory fo cus on the mean ing of 
ac tion and free dom. I will return to these re marks in the next sec tion; for now, 
con sider that to be conscripted is to “be made to serve” (in the ar my), and that 
the con script is the sub ject who is made to serve. The vi o lent instrumentalization 
in volved in con scrip tion must be read as in stan ti at ing and mod el ing a more gen­
eral mode of subjectification whereby sub jects are made to serve as means to the 
ends of the state. Indeed, Ben ja min’s gen er al iza tion of a cri tique of con scrip tion 
into “the cri tique of all le gal vi o lence” in di cates that the for mal struc ture at trib­
uted to con scrip tion is sim i larly gen er al iz able as a model of all le gal subjectifi­
cation: it is on oc ca sion and by vir tue of me di at ing the state’s nat u ral ends into 
le gal ends that the le gal sub ject comes into be ing. In this sense, the le gal sub ject 
is al ways al ready scripted into this me di at ing role, as ob ject, in stru ment, and 
agent of the state’s nat u ral ends. We may read Ben ja min’s in vo ca tion of “fate” in 
this sense of pre­scription,9 and note that the term makes its first ap pear ance in 
the text pre cisely as part of the con sid er ation of con scrip tion and the chal lenge it 
poses to cri tique. This is also where Ben ja min al ludes to his “sub se quent con sid­
er ation of the sphere of fate” (§9) in ref er ence to his later dis cus sion of the story 
of Ni o be, which too is most il lu mi nat ingly read as pro vid ing an ac count of le gal 
subjectification.10
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Critique
As Ben ja min’s dis cus sions of con scrip tion and the myth of Ni obe sug est, the con­
script, or the le gal sub ject, hosts the co in ci dence of law­pos it ing and law­pre serv ing 
vi o lence. The ex am ples that im me di ately fol low the dis cus sion of con scrip tion are 
those of cap i tal pun ish ment and the in sti tu tion of the po lice. These are also in stances 
in which law­pos it ing and law­pre serv ing vi o lence co in cide and mix, but the ways in 
which the mixing hap pens in each are quite dis tinct, with dif er ent im pli ca tions for 
the ques tion of cri tique, which Ben ja min raises in re la tion to each ex am ple.
In cap i tal pun ish ment, as in gen eral con scrip tion, the state ex er cises power 
over life and death. Some read ings em pha size this sov er eign pow er, to high light 
the con ti nu ity of the two man i fes ta tions of state vi o lence. For in stance, Ariela 
Azoulay reads both con scrip tion and cap i tal pun ish ment through Giorgio Agam­
ben’s reworking of Ben ja min’s “mere life” (§17) into “bare life,” and sug ests that 
both man i fes ta tions of state vi o lence de mand the strip ping of the sub ject from his 
or her “po lit i cal life.”11 But per haps the no tion of bare life ob scures more than it 
il lu mi na tes here: con scrip tion should be con sid ered much less a “strip ping” than 
a clad ding, in so far as it in volves be ing arrayed in du ty, name ly, the duty of defend­
ing a po lit i cal com mu ni ty, which is deemed an ex ten sion of an os ten si bly nat u­
ral right and ne ces sity to de fend one self. In con scrip tion, there fore, the sub ject is 
in deed clad with a “po lit i cal life,” which im poses par tic u lar ways of be ing and be ing 
in com mu ni ty. In con trast, cap i tal pun ish ment is de scribed in the es say in terms 
that em pha size its qual ity as a sin gu lar spec ta cle: vi o lence is said to “ap pear on the 
stage of the le gal or der”; and law’s “or i gins” are said to be “represented as they burst 
into the sta tus quo, manifesting them selves in a fear some man ner” (§9, em pha sis 
added). The seem ingly law­pre serv ing implementation of cap i tal pun ish ment is in 
fact a re en act ment and re it er a tion of law­pos it ing vi o lence. The law is renewed 
and reinforced through the re en act ment of the vi o lence at its or i gin on the body of 
the condemned. In one’s le gally im posed kill ing, one is no lon ger an agent of, but 
be comes merely a stage for law’s vi o lence. Therefore, while in the death pen alty 
the state merely claims the death of the sub ject, in con scrip tion it claims one’s life. 
Apparently cri tique is rather straight for ward in re la tion to cap i tal pun ish ment: 
Ben ja min sug ests that any crit i cism of the death pen alty gets to the root of the 
prob lem, “the law itself in its or i gin” (§9), even if in ad ver tent ly.
The in sti tu tion of the po lice, in turn, is de scribed as efecting not so much a 
spec tac u lar but rather a “spec tral” mix ture of the two types of le gal vi o lence. 
The dis tinc tion be tween law­pos it ing and law­pre serv ing vi o lence is said to be 
an nulled in po lice vi o lence, cre at ing a “form less” vi o lence that is “no where­tan gi ble, 
all ­per va sive, ghost ly” (§10). If cap i tal pun ish ment can be un der stood as a me dium 
through which originary and sov er eign vi o lence man i fests itself in spec ta cle, 
the “ig no mi ny” of the in sti tu tion of the po lice is bet ter grasped as the spec tral 
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me dium of rou tine ad min is tra tive vi o lence, given Ben ja min’s em pha sis on how 
the po lice im pose on the cit i zen “a life reg u lated by or di nances” (§10). We may 
note with Mi chael Taussig the “un abashed dis gust” in Ben ja min’s lan guage as he 
ru mi nates on the in sti tu tion of the po lice.12 A key rea son for his re vul sion seems 
to be how slip pery po lice vi o lence proves in the face of cri tique: “In con trast to law, 
which rec og nizes in a ‘de ci sion’ that is fixed in place and time a meta phys i cal cat e­
gory through which it raises a claim to cri tique, re fec tion on the in sti tu tion of the 
po lice en coun ters noth ing es sen tial” (§10). What im mu nizes po lice vi o lence from 
cri tique is its par tic u lar mixing of law­pre serv ing and law­pos it ing vi o lence: it can 
be held to ac count nei ther as a form of law­pos it ing vi o lence so that it may “prove 
itself in vic to ry” nor as a law­pre serv ing vi o lence so that it re frains from “set[ting] 
for itself new ends” (§10).13
If the death pen alty proves ob vi ous and po lice vi o lence eva sive for cri tique, the 
cri tique of con scrip tion is said to be “far less easy than the dec la ma tions of pac i fists 
and ac tiv ists pre tend” (§9). As we have seen, Ben ja min adds: “Rather, such a cri tique 
co in cides with the cri tique of all le gal vi o lence—that is, with the cri tique of le gal 
or ex ec u tive pow er—and is not to be ac com plished with a less am bi tious pro gram” 
(§9). What fol lows is a list of ap proaches that are bound to fail or re main “in ad e­
quate” and “im po tent,” no ta bly, no lon ger in the face of con scrip tion spe cifi  cal ly, 
but in the face of “all le gal vi o lence” into which the ex am ple of con scrip tion swiftly 
dis solves. In other words, what starts out as a ques tion of a cri tique of con scrip tion 
turns into a key ques tion of the es say, a cri tique of le gal vi o lence. What will be in ad­
e quate for such a task, we are told, are re form ist agen das that fo cus on laws rather 
than “the le gal or der itself root and branch” (§9). Also in ad e quate is Kant’s cat e gor i cal 
im per a tive with its “min i mal pro gram.”14 More sig nifi  cantly for our theme, Ben ja min 
dismisses what he calls “a child ish an ar chism” that re fuses to ac knowl edge any con­
straints on the per son and de clares “what pleases is per mit ted.” According to Ben ja­
min, any chal lenge that does not take stock of the mean ing of hu man ac tion and of 
free dom, but is in stead ad vanced “in the name of an amor phous ‘free dom’ with out 
be ing  able to des ig nate” a “higher or der of free dom” is bound to fail as a cri tique of 
le gal vi o lence. These pas sages can be read as pointing to the ways in which, as sub­
jects of mod ern law, we are al ways al ready conscripted into le gal vi o lence, so that our 
no tions of free dom are both en abled and circumscribed by law itself. The chal lenge 
that mod ern law poses to cri tique is in this sense bound up with the ways in which 
it col o nizes the very con di tions of cri tique through its pro cesses of subjectification.
Tragedy and Terror
If I read too much into Ben ja min’s dis cus sion of the chal lenge that con scrip tion 
poses to cri tique, this may be be cause I par tially read it in light of later texts that 
work with the no tion of con scrip tion in a more met a phor i cal reg is ter. Scholars of 
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co lo nial ism Talal Asad, Da vid Scott, and Samera Esmeir all draw on this no tion 
to trace co lo nial pro cesses of subjectification in re la tion to mod ern law. My jux ta­
po si tion of Ben ja min’s dis cus sion of con scrip tion with this lit er a ture might seem 
awk ward at first be cause Ben ja min, at the end of the open ing par a graphs of his 
es say, clearly de fi nes the ter ri to rial bound aries of his in quiry as those of Europe: 
“The di verse func tion of vi o lence, depending on whether it serves nat u ral or le gal 
ends, can be de vel oped with the most lu cid ity on the ba sis of some spe cific set 
of le gal cir cum stances. For the sake of sim plic i ty, the fol low ing dis cus sions will 
re fer to those of con tem po rary Europe” (§5). But as le gal his to ri ans of co lo nial ism 
teach us,15 “the rest” is no ex cep tion: the col o nies are not zones of ex clu sion from 
the uni ver sal ism, ide als, and prin ci ples of mod ern law, but rather the very lab o ra­
to ries of le gal­ad min is tra tive tech niques that come to in form le gal vi o lence in the 
metropoles.
Talal Asad bor rows the ti tle for his es say “Conscripts of Western Civilization” 
from Stanley Diamond, who wrote of con scrip tion as a met a phor for the pro cess 
by which co lo nial cul tures erased au then tic dif er ence by enforcing the adop tion of 
the stan dards of Western civ i li za tion. But in bor row ing the term, Asad also shifts 
the fo cus of the anal y sis from Diamond’s ques tion of whether au then tic dif er ence 
dis ap pears or re sists to the ques tion of how dif er ence “in creas ingly re sponds to 
and is man aged by, categories brought into play by mod ern forces.”16 A key force 
in what Asad calls the “im posed fate”17 of Westernization is mod ern law: “The 
point is that, in a mod ern state, laws are enacted not sim ply to com mand obe di­
ence and to main tain jus tice, but to en able or dis able its pop u la tion.”18 This func­
tion of “en abling or dis abling” a pop u la tion is a pro cess of subjectification: “the law 
be comes a means for cre at ing con di tions in which equal cit i zens can do cer tain 
things as ‘free agents.’ This change implies a de lib er ate trans for ma tion of sub jects 
from one kind of per son to an oth er.”19 Asad does not ex plic itly think with Ben ja­
min in this text, but we may note the res o nance be tween the scare quotes Asad 
places around “free agents” and Ben ja min’s in sis tence that a cri tique of le gal vi o­
lence re quires the for mu la tion of a “higher or der of free dom”—nei ther a no tion of 
free dom as circumscribed by mod ern law, nor “an amor phous ‘free dom’”—also in 
scare quotes—will suf ce.
In Conscripts of Modernity, Da vid Scott en gages closely with Asad’s met a phor 
of con scrip tion as first and fore most a prob lem of cri tique. Ofering a close read­
ing of C. L. R. James’s Black Jac o bins, Scott con sid ers how nar ra tive forms in form 
po lit i cal imaginaries by con fig ur ing the past, pres ent, and the fu ture in par tic u lar 
ways. Scott ques tions whether Romantic nar ra tives of eman ci pa tion have much to 
of er for an ef ec tive cri tique in our post co lo nial pres ent and in stead pro poses trag­
edy as an ap pro pri ate and crit i cal genre for our time. Rereading Black Jac o bins as a 
“trag edy of co lo nial en light en ment,” Scott re works Asad’s met a phor of con scrip tion 
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as hav ing ev ery thing to do with cri tique: “The ques tion is not whether the col o­
nized ac com mo dated or resisted but how co lo nial power transformed the ground 
on which ac com mo da tion or re sis tance was pos si ble in the first place, how co lo nial 
power reshaped or reorganised the con cep tual and in sti tu tional con di tions of pos­
si bil ity of so cial ac tion and its un der stand ing.”20 In Scott’s ac count, which re places 
Asad’s em pha sis on the coloniality of law with an em pha sis on a Foucauldian un der­
stand ing of “pow er,” con scrip tion is the name of a tragic for ma tion that de picts how 
mod ern forms of power shape the “cog ni tive­po lit i cal ter rain”21 of cri tique.
Conscription names the ter ror of mod ern law in Samera Esmeir’s book on the 
co lo nial his tory of the re la tion ship be tween law and the hu man. Also bor row ing 
the no tion from Asad, Esmeir uses it in the chap ter of her book Juridical Humanity 
ti tled “Conscripts” to de scribe the pro cesses by which mod ern law was in tro duced 
into Egypt un der Brit ish co lo nial rule. In part, this is a his tor i cal ac count of the 
up take of mod ern law by Egyp tian law yers, ju rists, and in tel lec tu als—the “con­
scrip tion” of the elite, as it were. But it is also an ac count of how the cat e gory of the 
hu man is grad u ally exhausted in its ju rid i cal defi  ni tion and le gal ne go ti a tions so as 
to erase the dis tinc tion be tween the nat u ral per son and the le gal per son. Reading 
her ar chi val ma te rial through Pe ter Goodrich’s ac count of le gal per son hood in the 
hu man ist tra di tion, Esmeir de scribes con scrip tion in terms of “the power of the 
law to call a sub ject into be ing where he or she can be gin to speak. . . .  Legal sub­
jects had no place out side the law and could only speak from within it. . . .  But the 
hu man, too, ceased to be out side the law. This is the ter ror of the law.”22
Evasion and Objection
In pro vid ing ac counts of co lo nial ism as a pro cess of con scrip tion into mod ern law, 
Asad, Scott, and Esmeir sig nal the cir cum scrip tion and col o ni za tion of cri tique that 
is in her ent in con scrip tion, when the lat ter is read as a pow er ful model for le gal 
subjectification, as im plied by Ben ja min in the “Critique.” Then again, in returning 
to Ben ja min’s text and the lit eral sense of con scrip tion, we might re cover a num ber 
of open ings in what oth er wise im poses itself as trag edy and ter ror or, in deed, as a 
seem ingly “fate ful or der” (§9).
One such open ing is aforded by the biographical read ing of Ben ja min’s dis­
cus sion of con scrip tion, as, for ex am ple, of ered by Azoulay, who dis cerns in the 
back ground of the text Ben ja min’s own en coun ter with the draft dur ing World War I. 
It is a cu ri ous sto ry: ap par ent ly, Ben ja min tried to en list vol un tar ily at the very start 
of the war. He men tions this in pass ing in “A Berlin Chronicle” and ex plains that he 
did so not out of na tion al is tic zeal but only be cause con scrip tion seemed in ev i ta­
ble, and he and his friends volunteered to en list to gether so as to be dis patched 
to the same front.23 He was rejected in this in stance, but as the war con tin ued and 
re quired more bod ies at the front, he was drafted twice, and twice he man aged to 
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evade con scrip tion with the help of hyp no sis, first by fak ing palsy and then by fak­
ing sci at i ca.24 When read in this biographical light, the later ref er ence in the “Cri­
tique” to ly ing and fraud as “wholly non vi o lent means” (§12) takes on a dif er ent 
hue. While these later re marks per tain to Ben ja min’s dis cus sion of the non vi o lent 
sphere of hu man com mu ni ca tion, it may not be amiss to trans pose that dis cus sion 
here and en ter tain the idea that tak ing re course to the “wholly non vi o lent means” 
of ly ing and fraud may in deed be a mean ing ful way to slip away from the grasp of 
con scrip tion and its vi o lent modes of instrumentalization.
A sec ond open ing may be aforded by read ing the con tem po rary sta tus of 
con sci en tious ob jec tion as a “right” ret ro spec tively into and through Ben ja min’s 
es say. At the time the “Critique” was writ ten, a num ber of states did have pro vi sions 
for ex emp tion from gen eral con scrip tion on the ba sis of re li gion or con sci ence, 
but this was less a rec og nized right than a tol er ated con ces sion.25 Today, con sci­
en tious ob jec tion is fig ured as a le gal right that pro vi des ex emp tion from gen eral 
con scrip tion in nu mer ous ju ris dic tions where mil i tary ser vice is com pul so ry. This 
is a con se quence of the en trench ment of hu man rights in the sec ond half of the 
twen ti eth cen tu ry, which in volved the pos i tive le gal in scrip tion of pro tec tion for 
nu mer ous “free doms,” in clud ing the right to free dom of thought, con sci ence, and 
re li gion that pro vi des a ba sis for re fus ing to be conscripted. What are the im pli ca­
tions of this his tor i cal turn for the “Critique,” and can this new re gime of rights be 
read through the text? On the one hand, the fact that “free dom” of con sci ence has to 
be ar tic u lated as a claim of right within a given le gal frame work sig nals pre cisely the 
cir cum scrip tions of mod ern law: it leaves no out side from which to speak, as Esmeir 
sug ests. And in deed, a grow ing body of lit er a ture crit i cal of the le gal­ideo log i cal 
ap pa ra tus of hu man rights teaches us the ways in which hu man rights have be come 
part and par cel of the “ter ror” of law. Yet there may be an open ing here nev er the­
less, es pe cially if we at tempt to read the en trench ment of hu man rights through the 
for mal scheme that Ben ja min of ers with regard to the dis tinc tion be tween nat u ral 
ends and le gal ends.
Consider that the fold ing of hu man rights into pos ited law re sem bles the ways 
in which self­de fense and the right to strike are found in law. As ex cep tions to the 
state’s pre rog a tive to turn its own nat u ral ends into le gal ends, these in stances 
al low the nat u ral ends of other le gal sub jects (in self­de fense, the in di vid ual per­
son; in the right to strike, or ga nized la bor) to be inscribed into pos ited law. Consider 
also that nei ther self­de fense nor the right to strike is un crit i cally championed as 
such in the “Critique.” To the con trary, there is the sense that as le gal ized categories 
they can par take in le gal vi o lence in im pure ways, as Ben ja min’s re vul sion to ward 
the doc tors’ strike sug ests (§13), and as the on go ing uses of le gal pro vi sions for 
self­de fense to pro tect rac ist kill ings in di cate. Still, these two ex am ples in the “Cri­
tique” pro vide open ings of a sort: as we have seen, self­de fense be comes an oc ca sion 
Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/critical-times/article-pdf/2/2/270/698851/270ertur.pdf
by guest
on 11 December 2019
E RT Ü R | C O N S C R I P T IO N A N D C R IT IQ U E  | 281
for Ben ja min to point to a mor al­his tor i cal sphere be yond en force able law, while 
the right to strike, when rad i cal ized in the form of the pro le tar ian strike, would 
lead to the dis man tling of law itself.
What is note wor thy here is that just like self­de fense and the right to strike, 
le gal pro vi sions that pro tect hu man rights can also be un der stood to fold sub jects’ 
nat u ral ends into le gal ends. Therefore, think ing within the scheme presented to 
us by Ben ja min in the “Critique,” and think ing along with him on the po ten tials (as 
well as the pit falls) of these ex cep tions to the state’s pre rog a tive, we may con sider 
whether the right to con sci ence can be sim i larly seen to pro vide an open ing be yond 
en force able law. We may, for ex am ple, con sider the pos si bil i ties presented by “to tal 
ob jec tion,” name ly, the re fusal to carry out civil ser vice that is of ered to rec og nized 
con sci en tious ob jec tors as the al ter na tive to mil i tary ser vice. In re fus ing to ful fill 
any sub sti tute du ty, to tal ob jec tors thus rad i cal ize the open ing that con sci en tious 
ob jec tion le gally pro vi des. Can to tal ob jec tion then be char ac ter ized as po ten tially 
articulating and ac com mo dat ing a “higher or der of free dom” that might be the 
un do ing of law?
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Notes
1. Ben ja min, “Toward the Critique of Violence.” Hereafter re ferred to as “Critique” and cited 
par en thet i cal ly.
2. Notable ex cep tions in re cent En glish­lan guage schol ar ship are Azoulay in “The Loss of 
Critique and the Critique of Violence”; and Andrew Ben ja min in Working with Walter Ben ja-
min.
3. Felman, Juridical Unconscious, 15–18.
4. See Azoulay, “Loss of Critique and the Critique of Violence,” 1021–24 for an ex tended  
dis cus sion.
5. For a mostly up­to­date sur vey of the le gal map of con scrip tion across 181 ju ris dic tions, 
see War Resisters’ International, “World Survey.” It must be not ed, how ev er, that in many 
ju ris dic tions where there is cur rently no com pul sory mil i tary ser vice, con scrip tion re mains 
“on the books,” as it were. Rather than be ing abolished in to to, it is merely suspended or not 
enforced. This in di cates that the le gal duty to serve in the mil i tary may be eas ily reactivated 
dur ing an emer gency or war. But the ques tion of whether con scrip tion is ac tively a law or 
pas sively a pos si bil ity is in ci den tal. More sa lient ly, “gen eral con scrip tion” must be un der stood 
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as a hall mark of the form of subjectification that the mod ern state en forces and de pends 
on, in so far as the state keeps at its dis posal the iden ti ties of those whom it could force into 
ser vice.
6. Hamacher, “Aformative, Strike,” 1133.
7. See Dorlin, Se défendre, for a suc cinct ac count of this con tin uum from Grotius on wards. 
Dorlin identifies the de vel op ment of this con tin uum through two main tra di tions: the 
An glo­Saxon tra di tion that un der stands the de fense of the na tion as an ex ten sion of the 
nat u ral right of self­de fense, and the con ti nen tal and spe cifi  cally French tra di tion that 
sub sti tutes the de fense of the na tion for self­de fense.
8. See Butler, “Walter Ben ja min and the Critique of Violence,” for a read ing of this move in 
terms of the fig u ra tion of the com mand ment “as a kind of law that is nei ther bind ing nor 
en force able by le gal vi o lence” (74) in line with a par tic u lar strand of Jew ish the ol o gy.
9. Admittedly, the no tion of “fate” has a spe cific mean ing in Ben ja min’s oeu vre based on his 
in ter pre ta tion of the clas si cal Greek con cep tion of fate. See his “Fate and Character”; and 
Andrew Ben ja min’s Working with Walter Ben ja min for a de tailed read ing of the sta tus of fate 
in that short text.
10. This in ci sive read ing is of ered by Judith Butler in “Walter Ben ja min and the Critique of 
Violence.” According to the myth, Ni o be, a mor tal, boasted of hav ing given birth to four­
teen chil dren, and claimed that she was bet ter than Leto, the god dess of fer til ity who 
gave birth to only two. Ofended and fu ri ous, Leto sent her chil dren, Apollo and Ar te mis, 
to pun ish Ni obe by kill ing her sons and daugh ters. Ben ja min writes, “To be sure, it could 
ap pear as though the ac tion of Apollo and Ar te mis were only a pun ish ment. But their vi o­
lence establishes a law far more than it punishes the trans gres sion of an existing one” (§15). 
Ar te mis then turned Ni obe into a rock from which her tears streamed eter nal ly. In Butler’s 
read ing, Ni o be’s “pun ish ment” is not a re sponse to the in fringe ment of al ready existing law 
but is rather the very in sti tu tion of law, a law­pos it ing vi o lence that trans fers the bur den of 
that vi o lence (the kill ing of four teen chil dren) onto the sub ject as a pet ri fy ing guilt: “To be 
a sub ject within these terms is to take re spon si bil ity for a vi o lence that pre cedes the sub­
ject and whose op er a tion is oc cluded by the sub ject who comes to at tri bute the vi o lence 
she suf ers to her own acts” (“Walter Ben ja min and the Critique of Violence,” 79). Also 
underlined in Andrew Ben ja min’s read ing of “Fate and Character” as a key el e ment of Ben­
ja min’s un der stand ing of le gal subjectification, “guilt” does not come into play ex plic itly in 
Ben ja min’s ear lier dis cus sion of con scrip tion in the “Critique.”
11. Azoulay, “Loss of Critique and the Critique of Violence,” 1023.
12. Taussig, Walter Ben ja min’s Grave, 184.
13. The dis tinc tion that Ben ja min makes in these pas sages be tween or di nances and de ci sions 
has enor mous sig nifi  cance for think ing about the re la tion ship be tween ad min is tra tive 
vi o lence and le gal vi o lence to day, al beit less in terms of an op po si tion be tween the two as 
Ben ja min seems to sug est, but rather in terms of the slip pery pack age in which they come, 
that is, ways in which the two are entangled in nu mer ous con tem po rary forms of gov er­
nance, es pe cially those pertaining to im pris on ment, im mi gra tion, coun ter ter ror ism, and 
pub lic or der.
14. See Hamacher, “Aformative, Strike,” 1150–53, for an ex tended dis cus sion of Ben ja min’s 
cri tique of the cat e gor i cal im per a tive through the lat ter’s in sis tence on “pure means.” 
Hamacher writes that Ben ja min sees the cat e gor i cal im per a tive as de mand ing too lit­
tle “be cause it con tin ues to cling to an end be yond means, and be cause it does not also 
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de mand that one nev er make use ei ther of one self or an other as a means to an end” (1151). In 
a read ing con gru ous with this in ter pre ta tion, Pe ter Fenves in Messianic Reduction links the 
cat e gor i cal im per a tive to Ben ja min’s dis cus sion of the pro le tar ian gen eral strike in a mar­
vel ous move: “cer tain con se quences can be drawn from [Ben ja min’s] ex pres sion of doubt 
about the vi a bil ity of the im per a tive, so for mu lat ed: ev ery con ceiv able form of ‘em ploy­
ment,’ in clud ing self­em ploy ment, is mor ally sus pect” (211), and then: “By no lon ger 
allowing them selves to be employed un der any con di tion, even one in which they would 
also be respected as ends­in­them selves, the strik ers ex press a max i mal ver sion of the cat e­
gor i cal im per a tive” (214).
15. See, for ex am ple, Hussain’s Jurisprudence of Emergency and “Beyond Norm and Exception,” 
and Esmeir’s Juridical Humanity and “On the Coloniality of Modern Law.”
16. Asad, “Conscripts of Western Civilization,” 333.
17. Asad, “Conscripts of Western Civilization,” 345.
18. Asad, “Conscripts of Western Civilization,” 335.
19. Asad, “Conscripts of Western Civilization,” 336.
20. Asad, “Conscripts of Western Civilization,” 119.
21. Scott, Conscripts of Modernity, 129.
22. Esmeir, Juridical Humanity, 105–6.
23. Ben ja min, “Berlin Chronicle,” 607.
24. Eiland and Jennings, Walter Ben ja min, 69–70, 91–92.
25. For ex am ple, dur ing World War I, Britain was one of the few states that pro vided le gal 
ex emp tion from gen eral con scrip tion for con sci en tious ob jec tors, but an ob jec tor had to 
first reg is ter for mil i tary ser vice, and then seek ex emp tion through pub lic tri bu nals that 
were by and large un sym pa thet ic. If an ob jec tor was granted ex emp tion, he had to serve in 
a non com bat ant ca pac ity in the gen eral mo bi li za tion—that is, in med i cal roles, or through 
la bor on roads and land. Notably, Germany did not pro vide any le gal ba sis for ex emp­
tions dur ing the war and those re fus ing to serve were ei ther in sti tu tion al ized as in sane or 
imprisoned for de ser tion.
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